2022 Fall Unified Agenda – DOT - FAA and Drones
As I noted earlier this week, the Biden Administration published the now misnamed 2022 Fall Unified Agenda. Instead of looking at Department of Transportation rulemakings en mass I will be looking at them from an issue perspective. First, I will look at the Federal Aviation Administration and unmanned aviation systems (UAS, or drones).
There are no rulemakings in the Unified Agenda and there are six rulemakings listed Long Term Agenda.
Spring 2022 Agenda
Back in June I discussed the drone rulemakings in the Spring 2022 Unified Agenda. That version of the Unified Agenda listed two active rulemakings:
External Marking Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft (2120-AL32), and
Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft (2120-AK82)
There were also two UAS rulemakings were listed in the Long Term Agenda:
Safe and Secure Operations of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (2120-AL26), and
Prohibit or Restrict the Operation of an Unmanned Aircraft in Close Proximity to a Fixed Site Facility (2120-AL33)
I discussed all four rulemakings in some detail.
Fall 2022 Unified Agenda
There are no drone related rulemakings in the latest version of the Unified Agenda.
There is one rulemaking listed in the Completed Actions portion of the Agenda: “Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations Using Special Airworthiness” (2120-AL81). That rulemaking was ‘Deleted at Agency Request’. While the abstract is not provided, it appears that the FAA had originally intended this rulemaking to be used in the same manner as “Airworthiness Directives” (2120-AA64) to support UAS Special Class Airworthiness criteria rules like the one issued in September.
Long Term Agenda
The DOT Long Term Agenda includes six listings:
The four highlighted rulemakings are carryovers from the 2022 Spring Unified Agenda discussed above. One of the unmarked rulemakings {“Unmanned Aircraft Systems Expanded Operations” (2120-AL01)}, was previously listed in the Spring 2022 Unified Agenda, but was not covered in my earlier post. According to the Abstract for the rulemaking:
“This rulemaking would enable expanded operations of small, unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) in the national airspace system (NAS). As a result, it would increase the utility of sUAS for operations under 14 CFR part 107, and would advance technology by encouraging innovation in this rapidly developing segment of the aviation industry.”
The remaining rulemaking on the above list is a brand-new listing in the Unified Agenda. According to the Abstract for the listing:
“This rulemaking would enable certain low altitude unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations, while ensuring the safety and efficiency of the United States airspace. It is the next step in incrementally integrating UAS into the national airspace system (NAS), providing for expanded safety, societal, and economic advantages and benefits. Using consensus-based standards, this rulemaking would establish a new section under title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations part 21 (14 CFR part 21) describing the regulatory process for issuing special airworthiness certificates for unmanned aircraft (weighing up to 1,320 pounds) as well as the acceptance of their associated elements.”
It looks like the regulations being considered under this rulemaking would have, in effect, authorized the rulemaking discussed above under the Completed Actions listing.
Commentary
The FAA continues to punt on its statutory requirement {PL 114-190 Section 2209 (130 STAT. 634)} to publish a rule to “establish a process to allow applicants to petition the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to prohibit or restrict the operation of an unmanned aircraft in close proximity to a fixed site facility”. This was supposed to have been accomplished by January 11th, 2017, now almost six years late.
Now this restricted airspace regulation would not solve the potential problem of UAS flying over or attacking critical infrastructure. There are still significant federal statutes and regulations that prohibit taking actions against aircraft that will have to be modified by Congress before protective actions can be taken. But, having said that, providing legal restrictions against UAS intruding on critical infrastructure would at least allow law enforcement to take actions against operators violating those restrictions.