Back in July Rep Finstad (R,MN) introduced HR 4590, that would codify Executive Order 14305, Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty. That EO notes that it is “the policy of the United States to ensure control over our national airspace and to protect the public, critical infrastructure, mass gathering events, and military and sensitive government installations and operations from threats posed by the careless or unlawful use of UAS.” No new spending is authorized.
EO Definitions
Section 2 of the Executive Order provides definitions for three key terms used in the EO. All of the terms are defined by reference to existing statutory definitions.
NOTE: The remaining ‘Section’ references in this post refer to sections in EO 14305.
Task Force Establishment
Section 4 establishes the Federal Task Force to Restore American Airspace Sovereignty. The Task Force would be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) and would include representatives of federal agencies designated the Chair. The Task Force would:
Review relevant operational, technical, and regulatory frameworks,
Develop and propose solutions to UAS threats, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, and
Make recommendations on the implementation of all actions identified in this order.
Air Space Regulations
Section 5 addresses the regulatory requirements of §2209 of the FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act (PL 114-190, 130 STAT. 634). That 2016 law required the FAA to establish a process whereby critical infrastructure facilities could request designation by the FAA as a drone no-fly zone. The EO requires the FAA to:
Submit a notice of proposed rulemaking on the topic to OMB (this was accomplished on May 13th, 2025, almost a month before the EO was signed),
Promulgate a final rule as soon as practicable after publication of the NPRM,
Conduct §2209 assessments in coordination with Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs), the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Attorney General, as appropriate, and
Make freely available online Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) and Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs) in an open format easily accepted for drone geofencing and Aircraft Navigation and Guidance system purposes.
Airspace Sovereignty
Section 6 requires:
DOJ to take appropriate steps to ensure full enforcement of applicable civil and criminal laws when drone operators endanger the public, violate established airspace restrictions, or operate a drone in furtherance of an element of another crime,
DOJ to periodically submit to the President, through the APNSA, legislative proposals that would revise criminal penalties for violations of restricted airspace, and
DOJ and DHS to ensure that their respective departments’ grant programs permit otherwise eligible State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) agencies to receive grants to purchase UAS or equipment or services for the detection, tracking, or identification of drones and drone signals, consistent with the legal authorities of those SLTTs.
Detection, ID, and Tracking UAS
Section 7 requires that:
Executive departments and agencies shall use all available existing authorities to employ equipment to detect, track, and identify drones and drone signals,
DOJ to revise the August 2020 “Advisory on the Application of Federal Laws to the Acquisition and Use of Technology to Detect and Mitigate Unmanned Aircraft Systems” to reflect relevant developments in Federal law and regulations addressing drones,
The FAA provide, to the extent permitted by law, including the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), automated real-time access to personal identifying information associated with UAS remote identification signals to appropriate executive departments and agencies and SLTT agencies for the purposes of enforcing applicable Federal or State law, with appropriate national security and privacy safeguards, and
DHS and the FAA publish guidance to aid private critical infrastructure owners or operators in employing technologies to detect, track, and identify drones and drone signals.
Enhancing General Protections
Section 8 requires that DHS and DOJ submit a recommendation to the President, through the APNSA, using risk-based assessment as defined in 6 U.S.C. 124n(k)(8), on whether the northern and southern land borders; large airports; Federal facilities; critical infrastructure; and military installations, facilities, and assets should be designated as covered facilities or assets under 6 USC 124n and 10 USC 130i and whether any changes to law would be necessary relating to such designation.
Counter UAS Capacity
Section 9 requires that:
DHS and DOJ explore integrating counter-UAS operational responses as part of Joint Terrorism Task Forces for the purpose of protecting mass gathering events, and
DOJ take all appropriate steps to implement the recommendations of the March 2022 Feasibility Report to Congress with regard to the creation of the National Training Center for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Center), and, upon establishment of the Center, focus initial training provided by the Center on development of Federal and SLTT capabilities to secure major upcoming national and international sporting events held in the United States.
Moving Forward
Finstad is not a member of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee to which this bill was assigned for primary consideration. This means that it is unlikely that there will be sufficient influence to see the bill considered in Committee. I suspect that the bill would not receive much support from Committee leadership as it would dilute the Committee’s efforts to pass a more comprehensive cUAS bill.
Three additional committees are also generally required to approve consideration of this bill before it moves to the House. The Energy and Commerce Committee would not be expected to move forward any bill sponsored by the T&I committee as that Committee has advanced a bill (HR 5061) that would remove the E&C committee from oversight of cUAS activities. Thus, unless the Speaker overrides the objections of the E&C committee, this bill will not be able to move forward to the floor of the House.
Commentary
Generally speaking, an Executive Order is not legally able to overcome any statutory prohibitions, at least for administrations other than 47. What is less clear is if the President can order a federal agency to add a grant use authority not authorized by statute. Almost grant authorization language includes a list of allowable uses for the funds to be provided under the described grant. The provisions of §6(c) of the EO would essentially require DHS and DOJ to ensure that their “grant programs permit otherwise eligible State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) agencies to receive grants to purchase UAS or equipment or services for the detection, tracking, or identification of drones and drone signals”, essentially adding a new authorized use. If this EO were codified into law, then it would be a new statute requiring the addition of the new authorized use. It would have been more effective, however, if the President had included a list of appropriate grant programs in §6.