Hydrogen Fuels and CFATS

Over the last two weeks I have written blog posts about four bills (S 646, S 647, S 648, and S 649) that have been introduced in the Senate addressing measures proposed to enhance and expand a hydrogen fuel economy. The bills would establish support programs in the Department of Energy and Department of Transportation ease a transition for hydrogen fuels to replace hydrocarbon fuels in heavy industry and for hydrogen fuel cells in transportation. These bills have addressed funding issues and even briefly address safety issues, but they completely overlooked the issues of security for facilities newly storing the hydrogen used in the projects.

CFATS Background

Hydrogen is a listed DHS chemical of interest (COI) for the Chemical Security Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. It is considered a release flammable security hazard chemical with a screening threshold quantity of 10,000-lbs with a reporting concentration of 1%. This means that any facility that has at least 10,000-lbs of hydrogen must report that inventory to CISA using the CFATS program’s Top Screen tool.

CISA’s Office of Chemical Security would then analyze the reported data to determine whether the reporting facility is a high-risk facility according to their classified risk assessment process. Covered facilities then have to develop a site security plan that provides a level of protection associated with their assigned Tier and the risk-based security guidelines outlined in CFATS Risk-Based Performance Standards (RBPS) guidance document.

The way the CFATS regulations were crafted, there is no one size fits all security program for facilities. Each facility works with their assigned chemical security inspector to craft a mix of security measures that would fulfill the RBPS standards for that facility. The one thing that is certain is that the security plan will be costly.

Even for facilities that are already covered CFATS facilities, adding hydrogen storage as a new COI for the facility will inevitably increase the security costs and may even increase the Tier rankings of a facility which could increase the general cost of security at the facility.

Easing Site Security Plan Concerns

The unknown security costs associated with the CFATS program are going to make it more difficult for organizations to plan for and construct new hydrogen fuel facilities. The fact that facilities are not able to predict exactly what security requirements a hypothetical hydrogen facility will require increases the uncertainty associated with the project. Such uncertainty will make it more difficult for DOE and DOT to encourage the expansion of the hydrogen economy that is the intent of the four bills introduced in the Senate.

If the crafters of these bills are serious in their intent to see the hydrogen economy expanded into an effective alternative energy system, Congress is going to have to deal with the uncertainty associated with the CFATS program. The easiest way to do that would be to make these energy facilities exempt from the CFATS program, but that would really do nothing to reduce the security risk associated with storage of hydrogen.

A simpler and more secure alternative would be to require CISA to establish a minimum set of security standards for different sizes and types of hydrogen storage facilities. As with the Expedited Approval Program established under 6 USC 622(c)(4), CISA could establish a model hydrogen facility security program which facilities would have the option of using instead of going through the standard site security plan process under the existing program.

From a legislative perspective this could be reasonably accomplished by modifying §622(c)(4) [and renumbering subsequent subparagraphs] to read:

(4) Expedited approval program

(A) Separate expedited approval programs will be developed for:

(i) covered chemical facilities assigned to tier 3 or 4, and

(ii) covered facilities of any tier that have hydrogen as a principal chemical-of-interest

(B) A covered facility wishing to use an expedited approval program may meet the requirement to develop and submit a site security plan under subsection (a)(2)(E) by developing and submitting to the Secretary:

(i) a site security plan and the certification described in subparagraph (D); or

(ii) a site security plan in conformance with a template authorized under subparagraph (I).

Facilities would not be required to use the Hydrogen EAP, thus avoiding the congressional mandate to avoid mandating security measures under the CFATS program. In fact, I would suspect that we might see facilities use the Hydrogen EAP for planning purposes in facility development and then go through the standard site security process in the hope of lowering their security costs.

Pre-Screening Sites for CFATS Coverage

For release flammable COI the location of the facility has some measure of influence on whether the risk assessment process determines if the facility is at high-risk of terrorist attack. If a facility siting team were able to provide necessary information to OCS about a proposed site, CISA should be able to tell a facility whether or not a facility would be designated as a covered facility and what Tier rating it would receive. All of which would impact the ultimate cost of the site security plan for the planned facility.

This problem could be solved for all greenfield manufacturing facilities that expect to have a reportable inventory of a DHS COI by adding a new §622(a)(3):

(3) establish a site screening tool to be used in the planning for the construction of a new chemical facility, or expanding an existing that is not covered by the CFATS program to determine if it would be a covered facility for a planned inventory of a DHS chemical of interest, and to which tier the facility would be assigned, if the facility were established or expanded as reported.

Conclusion

If congress really wants to encourage the expansion of the use of hydrogen as a fuel, they are going to have to reduce the uncertainties associated with the planning process. The recently introduced bills would address much of the financial uncertainty, but additional legislative efforts would need to be undertaken to reduce some of the security concerns related to provisions of the Chemical Security Anti-Terrorism Standards. CISA will need to be given authority to expand the Expedited Approval Program to include a separate, all tier, authority for a hydrogen expedite approval program. It would also be helpful if CISA was required to develop a formal program for evaluating planned facility construction or expansion to see if a planned site would be covered, or a tier would be changed for a planned inventory of COI.