S 3202 Introduced – AI Security
Back in November Sen Young (R,IN) introduced S 3202, the Advanced Artificial Intelligence Security Readiness Act of 2025. The bill would require the NSA’s Artificial Intelligence Security Center (AISC) to develop and disseminate security guidance that identifies potential vulnerabilities in covered artificial intelligence technologies and artificial intelligence supply chains. No new funding is authorized.
Definitions
Subsection 2(f) provides definitions for six key terms used in this legislation. Key technical terms include:
For the purposes of this blog it is important to note that the term ‘covered artificial intelligence technologies’ specifically includes “artificial intelligence systems that match or exceed human expert performance in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear matters, [and] cyber offense”.
Security Guidance
Subsection 2(a) establishes the requirement for the AISC to “develop and disseminate security guidance that identifies potential vulnerabilities in covered artificial intelligence technologies and artificial intelligence supply chains, with a focus on cybersecurity risks and security challenges that are unique to protecting artificial intelligence systems, associated computing environments, or the wider artificial intelligence supply chain from theft or sabotage by foreign threat actors.”
Subsection 2(b) outlines the elements that would be required to be included in the guidance:
Identification of potential vulnerabilities and cybersecurity challenges that are unique to protecting covered artificial intelligence technologies and the artificial intelligence supply chain, such as threat vectors that are less common or severe in conventional information technology systems.
Identification of elements of the artificial intelligence supply chain that, if accessed by threat actors, would meaningfully contribute to the actor’s ability to develop covered artificial intelligence technologies or compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of artificial intelligence systems or associated artificial intelligence supply chains.
Strategies to identify, protect, detect, respond to, and recover from cyber threats posed by threat actors targeting covered artificial intelligence technologies.
Those strategies would include:
Procedures to protect model weights or other competitively sensitive model artifacts,
Ways to mitigate insider threats, including personnel vetting processes,
Network access control procedures,
Counterintelligence and anti-espionage measures, and
Other measures that can be used to reduce threats of technology theft or sabotage by foreign threat actors.
The guidance would be published in an unclassified form, but a classified annex is expected. The AISC is required to produce “classified materials for conducting security briefings for service providers.”
Report to Congress
The National Security Agency is required to provide a report to Congress on the progress of the development of the guidance document; including a summary of progress on the development of the guidance, an outline of remaining sections, and any relevant insights about artificial intelligence security.
Moving Forward
Young and his sole cosponsor, Sen Kelly (D,AZ), are members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the committee to which this bill was referred for consideration. This means that there may be sufficient influence to see the bill considered in Committee. I was surprised to see that the word ‘voluntary’ was not used in this bill to describe the guidance being developed. Other than that, I see nothing in this bill that would engender any organized opposition. I suspect that there would be broad bipartisan support for the bill were it to be considered (after clarifying that the guidance was completely voluntary).
This bill will run into the same problem that most bills encounter in the Senate; it simply is not politically important enough to take the time necessary to proceed under regular order. I do suspect that this bill might be a reasonable candidate for consideration under the Senate’ unanimous consent process, but that is always an iffy process, being potentially subject to opposition for reasons having nothing to do with the provisions of the bill. This is a better candidate to be included in the annual intelligence authorization bill for FY 2027.
Commentary
For purposes of determining coverage in this blog, I am assuming that “performance in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear matters” in §2(f)(4) includes industrial control systems used in manufacturing in those ‘matters. I would, however, prefer to see that more explicitly laid out in the bill. To that end I would like to propose a new term: artificial intelligence supported manufacturing and would insert “including artificial intelligence supported manufacturing,” after the word ‘matters’ in that definition. I would then define that term in a new §2(f)(7):
“(7) The term ‘artificial intelligence supported manufacturing’ means the use of artificial intelligence to design, monitor, or control an information system, as that term is defined in 6 USC 650(14), used in a manufacturing process.”