Last month, Sen Risch (R,ID) introduced S 914, the Energy Threat Analysis Center (ETAC) Establishment Act of 2023. The bill would formally authorize the ETAC which DOE started last year as a pilot project (see here, here, and here). No separate funding is provided in the bill.
ETAC Establishment
Section 2(a) of the bill would require the DOE to establish the Energy Threat Analysis Center under 42 USC 18724(c). DOE would use the ETAC to:
Enhance situational awareness of threats to the security of the energy sector,
Analyze threats against the security of the energy sector,
Identify relevant security threat mitigation measures for energy systems, and
Support relevant response and restoration activities for the energy sector under existing constructs.
None of these activities specifically support any of the §18724(c) requirements.
Section 2(b) of the legislation would establish the functions of the ETAC, which would include:
Enabling an exchange of information on threat activity among government and industry to address energy security and resilience and shared energy sector security threats relating to national security, public health, safety, and the economy,
Improving detailed understanding of national security risks associated with the energy sector that are or could be exploited by adversaries, including nation-states,
Achieving a deeper understanding of the tactics, capabilities, and activities of threat actors that have the potential to impact systemic risks to the energy sector, and
Facilitating increased information sharing between government and industry of actual acute threat activity, including incidents, in a secure setting, physical and virtual, to facilitate the energy security and resilience of the United States.
Section 2(c) would require the ETAC to coordinate with:
The Department of Homeland Security, including the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (and specifically CISA’s Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative),
The Department of Defense, including United States Cyber Command, the National Security Agency, and the Army Interagency Training and Education Center of the National Guard Bureau (and specifically the NSA’s Cybersecurity Collaboration Center and Enduring Security Framework),
The Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and
Other Federal agencies and departments, as determined by the Secretary of Energy;
Moving Forward
Both Risch and his sole cosponsor (Sen Manchin {D,WV)} are members of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee to which this bill was assigned for consideration. This means that there may be sufficient influence to see the bill considered in Committee. Since no new funding is authorized by the bill, I see nothing that would engender any specific opposition. I suspect that there would be some measure of bipartisan support for the bill, probably enough to achieve 60 votes for cloture if the bill were to be considered under regular order.
Commentary
The crafters of this bill did not see the lack of specific funding for the NTAC to be a problem. They expected DOE to continue to tap into the funding ($50,000 per year through 2026) provided in §18724(d). that was the reason for the reference §18724 in §2(a) of the bill. It is almost as if the crafters of the §40125(c) of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Public Law No: 117-58) that is responsible for §18724 planned it that way.