Chemical Security Inspector Reduction in Force – Part 2

Chemical Security Inspector Reduction in Force – Part 2

I received this from a CISA Chemical Security Inspector that had recently received their reduction in force notification. I will note that this has been shared with at least one member of Congress. That is all that I am going to say about it today, it clearly stands on its own.

Dear Sir or Madam,

I am a Chemical Security Inspector (CSI) and Security Advisor for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Under the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) Program, the job entailed conducting regulatory compliance inspections^[1] at high-risk chemical facilities. More recently, it included conducting outreach, training and security assessments for critical infrastructure (CI) stakeholders across the sectors. The purpose of this communication is to inform you of the significant impacts to national security that will directly result from the loss of risk mitigation and reduction at high-risk chemical facilities and critical infrastructure^[2] in other sectors, and to ask that you please consider immediate action to prevent an irreversible and reckless decision. The rumored DOGE cuts we learned of last week include sweeping cuts to the inspector cadre and will potentially eliminate our workforce entirely. As of today, we are staffed at less than half of the Congressionally allocated positions nationwide.

The CFATS regulation was implemented swiftly, and despite initial challenges to its implementation, strong collaboration with and support from industry for the non-prescriptive and flexible security standards focused on physical security and cybersecurity, records management, and personnel surety, enabling its maturation to an internationally acclaimed risk-based security program. From the beginning, it included an elaborate cybersecurity component with stringent risk-based standards for the chemical sector to help ensure that dangerous chemicals, such as those used in the Oklahoma City bombing, could not be misappropriated and used to inflict harm on the American people. It cannot be understated that the CFATS program effectively assessed individual facilities based on the chemicals and inherent risks associated with them along with other factors to ensure that security plans were developed and implemented to maximize security and minimize risk at each facility. The team of field inspectors, augmented by a strong headquarters element, worked hand-in-hand with industry, forming an unlikely partnership between the regulated and regulators that is unique across government. This is attributed to the overall approach of the program and inspectors who developed common sense security assessments and solutions for facilities with low to no-cost improvement options.

The program faced challenges, including the perpetually short-term authorization, which caused uncertainty around the longevity of the program for government and industry, both of whom regularly lobbied for permanent authorization. For years, Department leadership testified alongside industry's chemical experts in support of permanent authorization for the program in order to prevent the potentially catastrophic consequences of an intentional act of chemical terrorism against the Homeland.

In July 2023, the House passed Republican-sponsored HR 4470^[3] with bipartisan support in the House and moved on to a unanimous consent vote in the Senate. Notwithstanding overwhelming bipartisan support in both chambers of Congress and unprecedented support from the chemical sector, the bill fell short of unanimous consent on July 27, 2023, with a single dissenting vote from Kentucky Republican Senator Rand Paul. Senator Paul admittedly did not oppose the premise of the regulation, but rather was using the vote as an opportunity to advocate for issues that were seemingly unrelated.

The lapse in regulatory authority for the CFATS regulation in July 2023 has put America at risk of dangerous chemicals falling into the wrong hands and the lack of vetting of individuals with terrorist ties through the terrorist screening database. Additionally, the insertion of members of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) beginning in January 2025 pose a potential threat to the integrity of the closely safeguarded chemical terrorism vulnerability information (CVI) that was collected in furtherance of CFATS from the private sector. Since the lapse, industry and government experts highlighted the loss of the vetting of employees through the Terrorist Screening Database as part of the highly effective Personnel Surety Program (PSP), as detrimental to the overall security of their facilities. CFATS facilities saw nearly a dozen names "hit" on submission and the CFATS program worked with local and federal law enforcement to appropriately address these identified threats. At a time when our elected officials express concern of attacks, it would seem irresponsible to allow our most critical and vulnerable industry to hire any person without proper vetting, checks or balances. Additionally, CSIs also played a critical role in liaison between facilities and law enforcement at all levels following incidents. Regulated CFATS facilities were required to report incidents and CSIs helped those who suffered and reported incidents involving suspicious photography, espionage from foreign adversaries, lost and stolen chemicals and cyber-attacks to name a few. Many of those facilities were uncomfortable working cooperatively with officials without the presence of CSIs advocating for them and suggesting security measures post incident to improve their security posture. The cooperative approach of the inspectors, working with industry, and state and local responders, resulted in a low-to-no cost, results-driven, comprehensive approach to security nationwide at America’s highest risk chemical facilities.

While the Agency worked with industry to reauthorize CFATS, the inspectors - thanks to the approval of Congress - were able to work as Security Advisors and to perform work similar to that of our Protective Security Advisor (PSA) colleagues in the field. Tasked with conducting security assessments for critical infrastructure partners across the sectors, including the Director's priority sectors deemed "target rich, resource poor," the efforts of the inspectors in these other sectors furthered the DHS and CISA mission of securing the nation's critical infrastructure. Functioning as Security Advisors, they were able to conduct assessments for facilities, (both chemical and non-chemical) such as the Security At First Entry (SAFE) Assessments, which provide actionable reports that directly impact and enhance security at K-12 Schools, Faith Based Centers, Critical Manufacturing, Agricultural, Water and Wastewater Treatment, Energy Sector partners and fuel terminals, and historical chemical facilities – CI that had largely been excluded by other voluntary programs. They provided needed force multiplication and were recognized by CISA leadership for their contributions. In fact, one region saw Inspectors complete more than double the amount of PSA engagements in the first half of this fiscal year.

The chemical security inspectors have been completely in the dark about the Agency's reorganization plans since DOGE, under the leadership of Elon Musk, began slashing programs across the government. This is not making America great. It is exposing vulnerabilities and making our country less safe than it was and should be.

When the CFATS regulation was in effect, CSIs nationally improved security at regulated facilities by 60%, far exceeding the effectiveness of other programs within the Agency. If cuts to CISA do not allow enough room for the CSI cadre to exist as the force multiplier they have been, perhaps consideration and priority should be given to keeping these positions and moving the program to another organization within DHS such as the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office. CWMD lacks a field presence, which would augment its existing capabilities to deliver services to the communities it serves. The Department could also look to the Project 2025,^[4] as its blueprint recognized the importance of and called for the CFATS to be moved to another agency to continue the chemical security mission.

The background of CSIs comprises a wide-array of experience from former law enforcement, fire service, explosives ordnance disposal, and military and special operations. Most have advanced degrees and years of additional private and public sector training. American citizens and private sector owners and operators of CI in the US benefit directly from the experience and services provided by these individuals through both the regulatory and voluntary programs.

We live in dangerous, uncertain times and the threat to our country has never been greater from both foreign and domestic enemies. It is not the time to sacrifice the security of our nation for the sake of saving a few pennies. We urge you to consider the criticality and potentially catastrophic consequences of failing to act to prevent and prepare for a chemical event and to reauthorize a chemical security regulatory program expeditiously before the Department eliminates this important work and the skilled individuals most qualified to conduct it. Americans need the chemicals regulated by CFATS to live their daily lives, but in the wrong hands, these chemicals have the potential to cause mass destruction. Over 89 Million Americans live within 2 miles of a historically regulated CFATS facility- nearly 1/3 of all Americans. Please consider whether that population deserves the protections of this program or if their lives should be left to chance.

Thank you for your time and consideration, and your dedication to protecting America.

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[1] In accordance with 6 CFR Part 27 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and later, the Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014 and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security (CISA) Act of 2018.

[2] Critical Infrastrcture as defined by the National Infrastructure Protection Program (NIPP) updated by DHS in 2013.

[3] The Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2023 sponsored by Rep Laurel Lee (R-FL-15)

[4] Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise, by The Heritage Foundation.